Attempts To Remove The Ottoman Empire From The War During World War I: Individual Peace Offers And Coup Attempts

Abstract

This article examines the multifaceted pressures faced by the Ottoman Empire at the intersection of military and diplomatic struggles centered on the Turkish Straits during the First World War. Focusing particularly on the Gallipoli Campaign, it analyzes the three-layered strategy developed by the Entente Powers to detach the Ottoman Empire from Germany, compel its withdrawal from the war, concentrate Ottoman forces on the main European front, and secure critical logistical support for Russia through the Straits. This strategy operated simultaneously through individual peace initiatives offering the Ottoman Empire attractive incentives such as guarantees of territorial integrity, financial assistance, and the preservation of the existing government; intensive propaganda efforts aimed at undermining alliance cohesion; and coup attempts targeting the Empire’s internal political structure.

Drawing on Ottoman archival documents, diplomatic reports, and contemporary press sources, the study demonstrates that these ostensibly appealing offers were rejected primarily due to the structural and historical distrust toward Russia. Military successes at Gallipoli and Kut al-Amara strengthened the Ottoman decision-makers’ capacity to resist covert diplomacy, psychological warfare, and attempts to destabilize domestic politics. These findings reveal that Ottoman alliance policy during the war was shaped not only by military considerations but also by diplomatic constraints and internal political dynamics.

The article approaches the military, diplomatic, and domestic political components of the Entente strategy as mutually reinforcing initiatives within an integrated analytical framework. It highlights the central geopolitical significance of the Turkish Straits in international politics, the Ottoman leadership’s determination to preserve alliance cohesion, and the limits of this resolve under intense external pressure. By uncovering the lesser-known dimension of clandestine diplomacy and coup planning—often overshadowed by the military narrative of Gallipoli—the study offers an original contribution to the existing scholarship.

The findings further indicate that the existential threat perceived from Russia made Germany an indispensable balancing and security partner for the Ottoman Empire, rendering short-term concessions in exchange for a separate peace strategically and politically irrational. In this respect, the study provides a detailed evaluation of the Ottoman government’s strategic prudence, diplomatic skill, and capacity to maintain internal political stability under complex wartime pressures. It also offers the literature a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding the relatively understudied secret diplomatic initiatives and mechanisms of internal opposition control in the context of Gallipoli and the Straits.