ISSN: 1011-727X
e-ISSN: 2667-5420

NECDET ÖZ

İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Rektörlük Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Bölümü, İstanbul/TÜRKİYE

Keywords: World War I, Gallipoli Campaign, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Trench Warfare, Field Fortification, the 19th Division, Tactic.

Abstract

From the early 19th century onwards, the dominance of offensive warfare over defensive warfare was challenged by World War I. On the Western Front, armies were stuck in trench warfare for nearly four years. Similarly, the Gallipoli Front was one of the most important fronts in World War I, where trench warfare was experienced. However, the prewar approach to field fortification proved inadequate in light of the new conditions of warfare. For the first time, multiple and continuous trench lines were constructed, reflecting a shift from the traditional single-line defense to a more complex, in-depth organizational strategy. These new understandings and practices exposed the danger of being stuck in defense, contrary to the earlier assumption that the war would ultimately be won through an offensive. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how the commanders of World War I, who had been trained in a military tradition dominated by the belief in the superiority of offensive warfare were confronted with the harsh realities of defense-responded to trench warfare. In this study, the war orders and reports of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the leading commander of the Çanakkale defence, between April 25, when the land battles for trench warfare began, and December 10, 1915, when he left the front, were examined. Mustafa Kemal Bey’s approach to trench warfare was based on an understanding of initiative superiority. It was determined that until September 1915, when important battles that could determine the outcome of the front took place, Mustafa Kemal tried to avoid the danger of being stuck in defence, accepted the counter-attack approach as the basic tactical approach and approached the organisation of the field fortifications with a counter-attack approach. However, after September 1915, when the front became a static positional battle, Mustafa Kemal commanded the front with an active defence approach, even though the front acquired a defensive character. Other tactical elements reflected in Mustafa Kemal’s battle orders and reports included in-depth organization, maintaining communication between trench lines, command and control order, use of support and reserve forces, fire management, observation and artillery-infantry co-operation. In this study, Mustafa Kemal’s military thought is analysed through the lens of trench warfare for the first time. This study is expected to contribute to the literature on Mustafa Kemal’s military thought, as well as to provide an explanation of trench warfare tactics used on the Battle of Gallipoli.