

UNDERSTANDING OF ATATÜRK'S FOREIGN POLICY: PEACE AT HOME, PEACE IN THE WORLD AND ACCESSION OF HATAY TO TURKEY

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Introduction

It is quite apparent that the words spelled out during the years of national struggle which he made it ended with a great success and triumph having achieved the integration of armed forces -nation, as well as during the periods that he served as the president upon the proclamation of Turkish Republic, in many occasions provided always taking the state and circumstances of the country into the consideration and the deeds he performed, policies he implemented have been intended to get alive during the aftermath of his death under the title of "Atatürk Principles" or the "Atatürkism"¹. The best definition of foreign policy of Atatürkism is described in his epigram "peace in the country, peace in the world". Atatürk who had directed the state life under a brand new administration method after a battle period of ten years, had made the Turkish Republic an Independent country with a strong identity and capacity, able to stand alone and contribute to regional peace and peace of the world thanks to the policies that he implemented during that era. However, those who asserted that they were his faithful followers, abandoned the state and the nation to develop on its own in every aspect, while

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¹The wordings of Atatürk that are pronounced in connection with his deeds during Atatürk's period had become significant verses today. But, It is rather interesting to see many people from every layer of the society to create a clause that would fit best for their intentions and make it to be taken the possession of Atatürk. One of the banners displayed during the 1992 Traffic Week would read "The Turkish Driver is the man of the most royal feelings K. ATATÜRK". It is naturally affirmative in the sense of it indicates the priority of Atatürk in the opinion of the Turkish people, but it is rather wrong in the sense of some people intend to do their deeds as they think fit personally sheltering behind his name.

making the Atatürkism the source of legitimacy of the era. Under such circumstances, The first thing to consider is that there had been something wrong with the opinions governing the state administration. However, despite such inconvenient conditions and insufficiencies it appeared that Atatürkism was rather successful under the personal implementation of Atatürk himself.

Bearing this in mind, we believe that the present Atatürkism, which is intended to be the systematised form of Atatürk's views, opinion and directives, misinterprets these very things, and has not been able to comprehend the basic sense of Atatürk's ideas. This is what lies behind the country's present problems.

In this study, it is intended to evaluate and analyse the meaning of the principle "peace at home, peace in the world" which is asserted and accepted to be the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, and the process which was implemented during the accession of Hatay to Turkey.

Atatürk always said, "I do not leave any moral heritage, any verses, dogmas, nor any moulded standard principles, my moral heritage is science and intelligence. What I have done and intended to do for the Turkish Nation lies in that. Anyone willing to appropriate my ideas for themselves after me will be my moral inheritors provided they would approve the guidance of science and intelligence on this axis".

Under the present global circumstances we are in the belief that we can be more efficient if we depend on Atatürk's Principle" peace at home, peace in the world" together with the existing means of our government, provided we are able to comprehend this principle in its real sense.

Atatürk's Principle of "Peace at Home, Peace in the World"

At this stage it is necessary to answer the question of what is the principle of "Peace at home, peace in the world". For this purpose, we must remember the conditions under which that principle was specified. When Atatürk had initiated the national struggle and held the general assembly meetings and congresses of Erzurum and Sivas, the decree was issued to defend the integrity of the country within its national borders against the foreign invader forces and their destructive interventions, hand in hand with all national elements. The approval of this principle was strongly advised to the participants of the parliament which was held the last time as the Otto-

man Parliament who came from Anatolia by Atatürk personally as the National Pact. The following statement of the Edirne Deputy Şeref Bey who proposed the approval of the bill of national pact has revealed the current situation very clearly "Whereas achieving and complying with the following terms and conditions which will include the maximised devotion and self sacrifice that could be risked for achieving the purpose of righteous and continuous peace for the independence of the country and the nation by the deputies of the Ottoman Parliament and..."².

So it appears that Atatürk believed that what could be done as the greatest sacrifice and devotion under then existing conditions was "approval of the borders of such devotion". We would like to remind that such borders meant the places within our country which were encircled once the Mudros Armistice was signed, which apparently included Hatay as well³.

The foreign policy implemented by Atatürk after having founded the Republic, including the maximum of the borders that are specified in the national pact, bears a character of an overall world policy. He carefully monitored every single event all over the world, having embraced the whole world and made the required preparations for future actions.

This is because he believed "We cannot think of ourselves living alone by closed eyes. We cannot also live by taking our country in a circle and keeping away from the global relations ourselves. Any country or nation who gets, involved in such a manner will be condemned to be put under the dominance and yoke of other nations who are able to embrace the philosophy of life in a larger angle"⁴

Today, when our country is apparently surrounded by the significant challenges of either the political, economic and geopolitics of appreciation, the question is what should have been done? Atatürk's answer to such a question is as follows "The ones who intend to save their country must also

² Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam*, II, Istanbul 1967, page 238.

³ See the map likely to be drawn by Atatürk When he was in the Military College for the staff officer education while studying on a national government model where he included the borders of western Thrace and the European land portion populated by the Turks in the southern part of Bulgaria, provided in the south it was also included Aleppo and Mosul for further reference see Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Sınıf Arkadaşım Atatürk*, Istanbul 1967, p. 116-11 Aydemir, *Tek Adam*, p. 239-240.

⁴ *Atatürkçülük*, III, Intellectual system of Atatürkism, Istanbul 1984 p. 123.

be honourable experts and scientific men in their professional lives. Only in this way can logical conclusions of every venture be achieved"⁵.

Under the foregoing, in the foreign policy, we should not say, "it is of no interest to me" when there is a certain problem somewhere in the world and cling to the principles of mutual equity and friendship. If such a problem exists, we must take care of it as if it had happened in our own country. Without regarding the distance of such events such a principle must always be observed, because "we never know whether such an event, which we assume to have occurred very far away, would effect us today or not. For this purpose it would be the best if we assume that the whole of humanity is one single body and the nation to be its organ. If there is any pain in the finger, the other organs are identically effected"⁶.

Atatürk, who always got involved and interested in almost every development taking place anywhere in the world, has executed peace pacts and peace co-operations in our region without releasing the initiative at all times in the protection of the government benefits against any approximated developments by monitoring the global developments and happenings, thus he contributed regional and global peace. In addition to The Balkans Entente (February 9, 1934), The Sadabad Pact (July 8, 1937) concluded in regional sense, the Montreux agreement with respect to the straits of Istanbul (the Bosphorus) which certified the sole Turkish Dominance over such was signed by him on July 20th 1936.

Another matter which is worth discussing before moving on to the Hatay Affair is to consider that Atatürk did not limited his foreign policy to only reliable relations. For the purpose of causing the Turkish Nation to live to the contemporary living standards of the civilisation true and contingent means and possibilities in respect of the intellectual, cultural and economical living conditions other than geography must be evaluated and duly considered. However, it must be borne in mind that Atatürk's foreign policy was actually based on respecting the territorial integrity of other nations. Atatürk, who states "in my opinion the arms rank last amongst the impacts which conclude the results achieved by force", always aimed to be powerful in the

⁵ Ibid, p. 113.

⁶ Ibid, p. 67.

sense of morality, science, and technical affairs⁷.

That is the first basis of all who are to work for the true happiness and development of the nation and the country, preserving our existence depending on our own strength within our national borders, to avoid involving the country and the nation in random ideas and unknown objectives resulting in loss and damages constituting the national foreign policy basis of ours in this path. Our international relations may be maintained intact without subjecting the country to the risk of involuntary wars and battles.

We clearly see the material execution of these principles during the process of accession of Hatay to the homeland.

Atatürk's Policy towards the Accession of Hatay to the homeland

Once the Mudros Armistice was executed the Iskenderun (Alexandretta) which was under the control of Atatürk's Forces was put under the control of the British then the French before and after the foregoing peace agreement respectively. However, Iskenderun in the opinion of Atatürk, was always included in the National Pact, and waited for convenience in terms of prevailing conditions.

As a matter of fact, some possibilities were even attained under the Ankara Agreement, which was executed on 20 October 1921. But, Iskenderun would be included within the borders of Syria provided the applicable currency would officially be the Turkish currency, and for the population every facility would be made available in order for them to preserve their national cultures. Despite the Italians and Germans, since the U.K. was evaluating Turkey as a valuable ally with reference to Mediterranean domination, and in accordance with such objectives having tried Turkey pulling to its own side had resulted in our concrete domination over the straits, as well as it provided us more liberty to move forward against France, which was uneasy about such developments.

⁷ *Ibid.* p.63. Atatürk describes the war as follows" I am not in favor of engaging the country in any war under whatsoever reasons, The war must be mandatory and vital. My real discretion is that, I must not suffer in conscious when I make the nation engaged in any war. We may enter in any war with the grounds that we will stand against the ones who yell we will kill you saying no we will not get killed .On the other hand, unless otherwise the life of nation is in danger, the war is a murder". The same work p.125.

Atatürk, who made the Hatay problem included in the agenda under such affirmative atmosphere, followed the developments with close attention as described above. During the process of France, who was making the preparations in respect of recognising the independence of Syria and Lebanon, he began to emphasise in the Parliament that it was the time for Hatay problem for settlement, which had been part of Turkish territory for the last 4000 years. Atatürk, who made the necessary internal arrangements, which in his opinion would activate during the application of his plan first of all caused the "Iskenderun and Antakya Aid Association" which was located in Istanbul to be transformed into the "Hatay Society of Sovereignty". He caused the formation of an active "Hatay Committee" with its centre in Dörtyol. On such occasions a political polemic was given a start in order to get Hatay back from France. A General Consulate was opened in Antakya.

Meanwhile, with the independence of Syria, which was awarded by France in 1936, the activities were accelerated. In the agreement executed between France and Syria the status of Iskenderun was not specified. It appeared that it was transferred to Syria as a "fait accompli". Turkey objected to this process and asked for further negotiations. At the end of the negotiations, which were rather negative in a sense, on October 9, 1936 a memorandum was delivered to France who claimed recognition of the independence of Iskenderun. Atatürk, in the statement he made in the parliament on 1 November 1936, heavily emphasised on the Hatay Affair, which had become the first concern of the Turkish Nation day and night. He said "The fate of Iskenderun, Antakya and the surrounding area, whose origin is Turkish, having deeply such true and actual privileges is the primary concern of the Turkish People and we must deal with this problem with determination and seriousness"⁸.

France rejected this approach on the ground that recognising the independence of Hatay would result in the separation of Syria behind its consideration about its own influence in the region without counting on the opinion of the people actually living in Hatay. After many memorandums that had been exchanged between the parties, upon the request of France the case was referred to the League of Nations.

The strained relations between the parties began to deteriorate by the

⁸ Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, I. Ankara 1945, p. 392.

help of police-public conflicts in Hatay and particularly after Atatürk's chairing the meeting of Council of Ministers on his return from Konya-Ulukışla in January 1937⁹.

The Importance of Press in Atatürk's Foreign Policy

The appropriation of the problem by Atatürk was not limited to words. He activated the press with his understanding of using all of the available means up to the end having taken the benefit of the nation into the consideration as a matter of precedence in his traditional way of settling the country's affairs.

However, between 22-26 Jan 1937, five essays he had dictated to the editor-in- chief of Kurun Gazette, Asım Us, in which had given the requisite messages to be transmitted to the related parties in this matter¹⁰. We can easily say that Turkey's exposure of its deterrent political attitude in insisting on the matter to the maximum possible extent had given acceleration to the decree in the meeting of the League of Nations, which was held in Geneva.

As a matter of displaying the attitude of Atatürk in terms of his foreign policy, it is worthwhile to examine these essays.

In the beginning, Atatürk, who has pointed out the endeavours of the French statesmen who were intending to put the matter in an insoluble situation, kept accusing the French diplomats that they were failing in the administration of the government while they were out of the capacity of appreciat-

⁹ When Atatürk traveled to Eskişehir, then to Konya was evaluated that he intended to approach to Hatay directly, particularly once he ordered General İzzettin the commander of the armed forces to wait for him in Konya, but after having met with General İsmet and Fevzi in Eskişehir he did not proceed further and traveled back to Ankara and chaired the meeting of council of ministers in Ankara was evaluated his intention to be forwarded to march directly to his target see Abdurrahman Melek , *Hatay Nasıl Kurtuldu*, Ankara 1966. P. 37.

¹⁰ Utkan Kocatürk, *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Kronolojisi, 1918-1938*, Ankara 1988, p.597. Atatürk had used the way of transmitting his messages through the columns of the head writers of the newspapers without charging any direct responsibility to the government in his relations with foreign countries in many other occasions. See the essays of Yunus Nadi, the head writer's columns of Cumhuriyet Gazette even for the problems of the straits, see.Haldun Derin,*Çankaya Özel Kalemimi Anımsarken*, (edited and published by Cemil Koçak) İstanbul 1995, p.107-108.

ing¹¹ the active energy which would be performed by the Republic of Turkey which was following up the Hatay question as a national concern in order to produce such for defending its rights and duties in doing so. When he has been involved in this process he was also very careful and diligent not to hurt the French Nation, what was interesting the most he was frequently addressing such to the friends of France in the international platforms. He was pointing out to U.K. and Russia that he wished them to act knowing the absolute righteousness of Turkey¹². In the second essay, he was referring to the French Foreign Affairs, and specifying the unavoidable significance of Turkey for France. In his statements he was inquiring the foreign affairs by saying "Are they the intelligence, freedom and moral inheritors of the great French revolutionaries who have announced the declaration of the human laws, or the fanatics who are trying the patronage the expatriated French monks in the countries which are developing in the path of development and trying to defend the hazardous and destructive activities of them? Whereby he as a matter of fact intended to invite them to see the realities of the scene in fact.

As a matter of fact, Atatürk who continued, "While reading the cruelty of the French Mercenaries that they have committed over the Hatay Turks who have been desperately struggling for the liberty and independence these and other similar questions rushed into my mind", could not set a liaison between the past and the present situation of the Quai d'Orsay¹³.

Atatürk has drawn the attention to the matter that France who could only achieve beating their eternal enemy Germany by the assistance of USA and the rest of the world, hurt the feelings of U.K and Russia, and defined the French Foreign Affairs "An entity which has worsened the vital benefits of French Nation with the persistence and negligence associated with daydreamers' show off"¹⁴.

Atatürk stated that France, in this situation, "due to the blindness of their Foreign Affairs today it is about to lose one more friend who is leaning on it" and continued his warning "the Quai d'Orsay (French Ministry for For-

¹¹ *Kurun Gazette*, edition no. 6838, dd, 22 January 1937. The essay of Asım Us with the heading of "a message to the friends of France" p.1

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ We know that Atatürk was very much impressed by the French Revolution.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

eign Affairs) can be happy for its enriching collection of treason to its own nation generating from its irrational attitude"¹⁵.

Having transmitted the messages he thought fit to France in foregoing manner he intended to address the common allies in order to use the increasing significance of Turkey.

When Turkey referred the Hatay problem to the agenda of the League of Nations, he proved that he also honoured and credited the friendship of other countries which he wished to be relayed by them to France, unless otherwise our esteemed allies would be considered to be in gross negligence in appreciating Turkish self-respect and the honour and dignity of Turkish Nation in line with the negligent attitude of France. In such case he was willing to tell both "France and the friendly governments that Republic of Turkey knew the way of preserving its rights and benefits with its dignity and honour"¹⁶. On the other hand, having the matter to be directed in this course could lead Turkey in an undesirable political platform which Turkey was never willing to be in. The impact of such a selection might have influenced some other points. Atatürk, as a matter of fact, was willing to tell to the other countries who were assuming Turkey to be the continuation of Ottoman Empire that they would undertake what is requisite in terms of their duties to execute on their part before the matter worsened.

When the situation is examined carefully, Atatürk continued to address the governments who asserted to have worked for global peace, and always intended to avoid disregarding them in such vital matters. Turkey had sufficient power and force to take Hatay. However, either the regional developments, or the circumstances generated thereunder or the atmosphere of cooperation that they were in were at such a convenient level, which would avoid entering any war for such a purpose. Atatürk who was able to follow such circumstances and making the required overall specifications, was always expected that "He would entrust that there would be people if reason and foresight who could appreciate the global benefits of France, particularly the ones who could evaluate the existing safety factors and the situation in

¹⁵ Kurun edition no. 6839, dated 23 January 1937, Saturday, The essay by Asım Us with the heading "Kedorseg in Paris" . p.1.

¹⁶ Kurun, edition no. 6840, 24 January 1937 , the essay by Asım Us with the heading "Turkey knows the way of protecting and defending its rights and benefits". p.1.

the Middle East"¹⁷. As a matter of fact, in Geneva, the views of Turkey were significantly to synchronise with the views of the major countries. However, he never believed what has been told around without achieving any substantial conclusion in this regard. Therefore he preferred to wait for the government release to be made. Meanwhile, the permitted time limit of 15 days allocated for the settlement of conflict had been already expired. Atatürk was a little restless because he was susceptible and had serious concerns, because he thought, during the meetings, the ones who were pretending to take their standing on the Turkish side, while in the matters which appeared to be not more than simple details might be compassed and made them appear under illegal purpose. Therefore he had taken an extremely strong position as the final step. "France and the whole world are required to know the reality without any further delay; The Turkish Republic is not an entity that could be easily deceived. The ones who assume that they can deceive, then there should be no doubt that they having such contingent assumptions would be the real ones who are irrevocably deceived and such deception might never be compensated, have no doubt about it"¹⁸. Turkey was extremely determined in the project of accession of Hatay to Turkey, which it made a matter of self-respect.

As the President and the most authoritative voice of the country he stated "Once the Republic of Turkey suggested the Hatay question in which it was totally right, who could ever assert that it did not consider all of the consequences of such a deed itself?"¹⁹. The question was developed in a capacity of international aspect and Turkey was right. "From now on everybody else must carefully look at the words and from whose mouth, which is worth to listen to, they are spoken. The righteous and logical words of the Turks represent directly the Turks themselves. Thus, "not to respect it and fail to comply with it, avoid to recognise it, not to take it into the consideration, will be subjected to an absolute end they could never thought of with no doubt"²⁰. Atatürk's saying "that is all at this moment that we could tell you all" implied that the next step would be putting on his boots and leading to the front at the head of the soldiers.

¹⁷ Kurun, edition no. 6841, 25 November 1937.

¹⁸ Kurun, edition no. 6842, 26 January 1937 Tuesday, the essay with the heading "Turkey can not be deceived", p.1.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

Towards to the Solution

After having implied that Atatürk would not have avoided the war as the last solution, we see reconciliation in the meeting that was held in Geneva on 17 January. The question of language that was considered as the last shagginess was settled by approving the Turkish language as the official language, provided that Arabic would be the second language if necessary. Thus the seas were not rough any more.

The Hatay question was considered to have been settled at this stage in Turkey's opinion. First of all, it was being officially recognised as a separate entity while it was just about to be left to the control and mercy of Syria. Asım Us was evaluating the matter as breaking of the assassination arms which were made available to stab into the heart of our country from the southern borders in addition to saving the life and rights of 300.000 Turks²¹.

On January 28, while Atatürk was congratulating the government, in the person of Prime Minister İnönü, for his wisdom, prediction and dignity, İnönü truthfully specifying that "the way and method which was followed by the government in the Hatay question have been the work of Atatürk's inspiration and inculcation"²².

The League of Nations approved a special status which constituted Iskenderun as a separate area free in its internal affairs but attached to Syria in foreign affairs, and holding its own constitutional law (27 January 1937). Under this agreement Iskenderun was named "HATAY" which was given by Atatürk, and a constitutional law was approved after having obtained the views of Parties by the League of Nations. Once the constitutional law was put in force on 29 May 1937, Turkey and France accepted to be the grantors of Hatay. Upon such development, with the increasing trust associated with the meetings of the people for independence in Hatay into an armed conflict when the French soldiers had interfered in the meeting. When the French soldiers provoked the minority against Turkey, this time the Turkish community was agitated. During the election, which was held pursuant to the constitutional law, many incidents occurred. The League of Nations stopped such conflicts. When the French colony officers provoked the riots in Hatay,

²¹ Kurun, edition No. 6841, 27 January 1937 the essay with the heading of "we achieved our goal"

²² Ibid.

Turkey had to drive the run and taken control and the initiative. Atatürk did not let it go and caused the press to announce and duly publish his decision accordingly. On November 10, 1937, one year prior to his death, in an interview he held with the Cumhuriyet Gazette, he pointed out that the Hatay question had been his own personal problem.

His intention was relayed to the French Ambassador. He clearly described his determination so that he did not think of any armed intervention for the moment but he had decided by taking every possible means into consideration (including war) he relayed his determinant statement to the French Ambassador. Despite the very low possibility of war, should it occur he declared that he would resign from this position as President and Member of Parliament deputy and proceed to Hatay with a handful friends who most likely would join him and continue the struggle with the local people there²³.

Conclusion

As he said to Ruşen Eşref at this time, he was not interested in territorial conquests, and had no intention of violating any peace agreement. On the other hand he could not have waived his contractual rights either. He would keep his word to his beloved nation who believed in him. Thus, when relations reached such level and shaped in such dimensions, he ordered to deploy some military corps to the south. On 10 May 1938 he caused a military parade to take place in Mersin which lasted many hours, despite his serious illness²⁴. Once France had observed the extent of Atatürk's determination she appointed a Turkish Governor to Hatay having stepped back.

²³ Enver Ziya Karal, *Atatürk'den Düşünceler*, Istanbul 1986, p.

²⁴ Atatürk's trying to handle the matter with such extend of determination made his close circle to worry about breaking out a war. But, he was a commander who would never consider the war unless he really had to. As a matter of fact, upon one of his civilian friends stood up and said" my general, why are you worrying yourself that much, you could take over Hatay if you deploy a division to Hatay even tomorrow. Don't you see that the Germans entered Renani, and the France could do nothing, the ones who could do nothing for Renani do you think would dare to a war with Turkey because of a sub province of Syria?", he retorted, "Yes, if I deploy one division tomorrow morning I may take over Hatay, the ones who could do nothing for Renani would not dare to a war with Turkey because of a sub province of Syria that is right. I know it. But should they take the matter as a matter of an honor and dignity? You never know what the nations might do, I can not dare a risk of war for Turkey because of a sub province myself". It is not a cowardice. It must be evaluated as the meaning of love for the nation and the country when there is the means of politics still available the though of war is to be avoided. Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya*, Istanbul, 1969.p.488.

The annexation of Austria to Germany in March 1938, the imperialist activities of Italy in the Mediterranean basin, that is strengthening of Berlin-Rome axis necessitated the requirement of a support that might be relied on in the eastern Mediterranean region by Britain and its allies²⁵. Afterwards, France manifested favourable behaviour on the Turkish side.

On 3 July 1938 Turkey and France agreed to send peace forces comprising 2.500 soldiers each in order to obtain the territorial integrity and political status of Hatay. On 4 July 1938 the Turkish Peace Corps took over duty in Hatay. In the general elections held on 3 August 1938 the Turks won 22 out of 40 seats. At the first general assembly meeting held on 02 September 1938 the parliament proclaimed the Republic of Hatay, provided it would be free in the Republic itself while having been attached to France in its foreign relations.

Atatürk could not see the decrees of the parliament with reference to the accession to Turkey on 30 June 1939 and pursuant to the approvals of Turkish Civil law and the Criminal Code on 1 January 1939 by the Hatay Parliament. However, he had followed up the Hatay question with close interest, which was deeply connected to the territorial integrity of Turkey itself and provided the settlement of conflict in favour of the Turkish Nation with the help of international developments.

If we look at these developments, Atatürk's general attitude revealed that he always preferred to follow peaceful means to the end, and only when they failed then choose the armed solution. Another extraction from the articles is that, in international relations he made his counterparts felt at the beginning that he had taken all risks into consideration and could be reached to the last point when the matters were related to the rights of the nation and the country. This was not aggressiveness, and must not be considered a noisy advertising. Atatürk, in the Agreement of Straits of Montreaux, had proven that the way of living by owning the honour and benefits in the civilised world as was personally practised in the accession process of Hatay to the homeland and it was duly implemented thereunder. As long as such a path is followed

²⁵ For a remarkable summary of England and France' despair in feeling and requiring the Turkish support at Mediterranean region against the alliance of Germany and Italy despite they both assumed that Turkey's strong positioning in the region particularly having taken over Hatay would not concord with their benefits see Ali Arslan, "Hatay Mesclesinde İngilizlerin Tutumu", *II. Hatay Tarih ve Folklor Sempozyumu*, Hatay 1992.

it is apparent that national and governmental success will be always available in the present and the future.

ÖZET

Atatürk'ün dış politikasını anlamak Türkiye'nin menfaatlerini korumak için hala temel hareket noktasıdır. O, mesafeleri dikkate almadan dünyanın her yerindeki gelişmeleri takip ederdi. Onun anlayışında askeri güç kullanmak son çözümdü. Bu yüzden Balkan Paktı ve Sadabat Paktı gibi oluşumlarla bölge barışına katkıda bulundu. O Türk halkına Hatayı alacağına söz vermişti. Hayatının son yılında asker yerine basını kullandı. Kurun Gazetesinde Asım Us'a Fransa'nın milletlerarası platformdaki dostlarına mesajlar içeren beş makale yayımladı. Bunlarda Türkiye'nin Hatay'ın ilhakını mümkün kılacak her şeyi yapacağını ifade etti.

Hatay ve İstanbul'da Hatay komiteleri ve yardım dernekleri kurdu. Bütün bu düzenlemelerin sonucunda Milletler Cemiyeti İskenderun'a içişlerinde serbest, dışişlerinde Suriye'ye bağlı bir statü verdi. Hatay parlamentosu 2 Eylül 1938'de Cumhuriyet ilan ettikten sonra 30 Haziran 1939'da Türkiye'ye ilhakı kabul etti. O'nun yakın ilgisi sayesinde Türkiye'nin çok stratejik bir parçası askeri problemlerle uğraşmadan kazanıldı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yurtta Sulh Cihanda Sulh, Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası, Atatürk'ün Dünya Politikası, Kurun Gazetesi, Asım Us, Hatay'ın İlhakı, Misak-ı Milli, Milletler Cemiyeti, Suriye'nin Bağımsızlığı.

ABSTRACT

Understanding Atatürk's Foreign Policy is still basic point in order to defend Turkey's rights. Without regarding the distance he always kept in touch with the developments which were seen all over the world. According to his point of view using army was the last solution. Therefore he contribute to the regional peace, by Balkan Pact and Sadabad Pact. He had promised to Turkish Nation that, he will get Hatay in to Turkey. In his last year, he used the media instead of army. He had dictated five articles under the name of Asım Us in Kurun Gazette by which addressing the friends of France in the international platforms. He stated that Turkey can implement everything what it is possible for Annexation. He caused the formation of several Hatay Committee and Aid Association both in Hatay and Istanbul. At the end of such arrangements The League of Nations approved a special status which constituted Iskenderun as a separate area free in its internal affairs but attached Syria in foreign. Hatay Parliament had proclaimed the Republic on 2 September 1938, finally on 30 June 1939 annexation to Turkey. With the help of his close interest very strategic part of Turkey was gained without militarist problem.

Key Words: Atatürk's Foreign Policy, Kurun Gazette, Asım Us, Annexation of Hatay, Misak-ı Milli, Atatürk's World Policy, League of Nations, Independence of Syria